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Introduction 28 
The Cancer Drugs Fund (CDF) in England was established in 2011 to facilitate access to cancer 29 
medicines that were not routinely available on the National Health Service (NHS). By 2015/16, the cost 30 
of the CDF had reached £1.27bn1, and its value has been criticised extensively2–4 . Since July 2016, a 31 
new arrangement which involves the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in the 32 
appraisal of CDF medicines came into effect5. Medicines on the CDF as of 31st March 2016 were 33 
appraised by NICE and their continued funding was dependent on an expenditure control mechanism 34 
to prevent overspend as had happened in previous years (e.g. by £126m (37%) in 2015/16). Under the 35 
current scheme, new cancer medicines may be recommended by NICE for routine commissioning (if 36 
considered to be clinically and cost-effective), recommended for use within the new CDF (if there is 37 
good potential, but considerable clinical uncertainty) or not recommended at all. Medicines available 38 
via the new CDF require a Managed Access Agreement, which consists of a Data Collection 39 
Arrangement, setting out which data are to be collected to resolve clinical uncertainty, and a 40 
Commercial Agreement that determines how much the NHS will pay for the treatment during the 41 
managed access period.  42 
Since April 2016 and the introduction of the new CDF, NICE has accelerated its review of cancer 43 
medicines listed on the original CDF, as well as newer cancer medicines. During the two year period 44 
to March 2018, 40 cancer treatments for 54 indications were recommended for routine 45 
commissioning by NICE6. Medicines for 34 of these indications were considered under the NICE End 46 
of Life policy 7, which places a maximum weighting of 2.5 on quality-adjusted life year (QALY) gains. 47 
This, in effect, increases the cost effectiveness threshold from the £20,000 to £30,000 range, to 48 
£50,000 per QALY. 49 
There is a concerning trend in the lack of transparency in relation to CDF medicines; specifically, as 50 
explored in this commentary, in respect to their value and overall cost to the NHS.  This is further 51 
exacerbated by medicines remaining on the CDF beyond specified time-limited periods.  52 
Value of CDF medicines 53 
There is very limited public disclosure of the value of new cancer medicines. Following the introduction 54 
of the new CDF and resultant stricter inclusion criteria, as well as a drive by NICE to clear the backlog 55 
of medicines that were within the CDF without review, a NICE recommendation or inclusion within 56 
the CDF has required that medicines fall within accepted cost-effectiveness thresholds. Companies 57 
have achieved the requisite reduction in ICERs through offering confidential discounts to listed drug 58 
prices. While NICE aims to ensure that its appraisal processes are as transparent as possible, the 59 
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widespread use of “commercial-in-confidence” pricing discounts agreed between NHS England and 60 
the manufacturer prevents independent scrutiny of the decision-making process.   61 
In the 2-year period from April 2016, justifications provided by NICE for the positive recommendation 62 
of 36 of 70 treatment comparisons involving routinely commissioned CDF medicines, were on the 63 
basis of them being a “cost-effective use of NHS resources” or falling “below the NICE threshold” or 64 
were not even clearly defined (Table 1). Fifty one percent of comparisons lacked transparency to the 65 
extent that the ICERs used for decision-making were not reported. 66 
Over the same period, NICE appraised 27 CDF medicines for 42 clinical indications involving 48 67 
treatment comparisons. Nearly a half (20/42) were legacy indications from the original CDF and a third 68 
(14/42) were appraised using the end of life criteria. The reporting of decision-making ICERs is even 69 
more notably absent, with ICER values reported for only 6 of the 48 comparisons, (avelumab TA517, 70 
brentuximab TA446, ibrutinib TA502, ixazomib TA505, nivolumab TA483 and nivolumab TA490) with 71 
a further 2 comparisons reported as being dominant (lenvatinib with everolimus TA498). The large 72 
majority (83%) of comparisons failed to report any decision-making values, but rather, used generic 73 
statements such as being “within acceptable NICE thresholds”, or with “plausible potential to be cost-74 
effective” or, in 16/42 cases, were without a published technology appraisal.  75 
Decisions were not routinely bound by NICE cost-effectiveness thresholds. For all reviewed treatments 76 
in routine commissioning and funded within the CDF, 7 interventions, which considered 9 77 
comparisons, were approved for funding when the ICERs were subject to multiple scenarios and were 78 
reported as a range which crossed thresholds, or were above the NICE thresholds (abiraterone TA387, 79 
enzalutamide TA377, ponatinib TA451, ixazomib TA505, lenvatinib ID1059, nivolumab TA483, 80 
sorafenib ID1059). In the case of lenvatininb and sorafenib for the treatment of differentiated thyroid 81 
cancer after radioactive iodine, both were recommended with unspecified ICERs in excess of £30,000 82 
per QALY on the basis of uncaptured benefits and there being no other treatment option for a rare 83 
disease, despite rarity in general not justifying a higher threshold8.  84 
Despite NICE stating that “Data that are likely to be fundamental to the appraisal committee's 85 
decision-making cannot be marked as confidential (for example, the incremental cost-effectiveness 86 
ratio estimates)”9, access to this information is inconsistent through the use of variable redaction 87 
practices10 to protect undisclosed price discounts. As a consequence, neither NHS hospital managers 88 
and commissioners responsible for allocating funds and delivering treatment, nor the tax-paying 89 
general public who fund healthcare in England and Wales are informed of the true value of these new 90 
cancer treatments.  It is clear that primacy is given to protecting commercial confidentiality, which is 91 
especially important to the pharmaceutical industry given that UK drug prices are widely referenced 92 
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by other countries and a reported ICER value could be used to back-calculate the NHS-agreed price. 93 
However, this price concealment may soon no longer be acceptable, as the World Health Assembly 94 
resolution to publicly disclose medicine prices gains momentum, despite reservations by the UK11. 95 
Unknown cost 96 
It is equally difficult to determine the overall cost of CDF treatments. NHS England reported that in 97 
2017-18, the CDF operated within its capped funding allowance of £340m, with a total spend of just 98 
over £200m12,  the underspend associated with a high number of medicines shifting out of the CDF 99 
and into routine commissioning following NICE appraisal during this time period. NHS England 100 
expenditure on the 40 cancer treatments that transitioned from the CDF to routine commissioning 101 
between April 2016 and March 2018 increased from £686 million in 2015/16 to over £1,100 million in 102 
2017/1813, with the top 10 medicines by increase in spend (cabozantinib, dabrafenib, enzalutamide, 103 
ibrutinib, nivolumab, palbociclib, pembrolizumab, pertuzumab, ruxolitinib and trametinib) accounting 104 
for over 90% of the increase overall. Expenditure on pembrolizumab alone increased from £12m to 105 
£142m during this period, a considerable cost for a medicine of (publicly) unknown value14.  106 
Time on CDF 107 
Transparency is not only lacking for cost-effectiveness data, but also for time within the CDF. NHS 108 
England’s new CDF Standard Operating Procedure specifies that drugs should be funded through the 109 
CDF for a time period that is to be as short as possible5. This is usually, but not exclusively, two years, 110 
whilst allowing for some flexibility in relation to uncertainty, the rarity of the cancer and the source of 111 
the data which addresses the uncertainty15. However, this time limit is not consistently adhered in 112 
practice. By March 2018, the two year window was met by only 14 (33%) of the 42 indications in the 113 
new CDF (Table 2), with 3 (7%) being, or expected to be, funded within the CDF for between 3-4 years, 114 
and 6 (14%) for more than 4 years. The expected duration of time in the CDF was unknown for a 115 
further 14 (33%) indications, with the majority of these either suspended, or with no data to suggest 116 
how long CDF funding will continue, or any justification for either their original or ongoing inclusion 117 
with the fund. 118 
Implications 119 
NICE considers interventions with ICERs below £20,000 per QALY to generally be a cost-effective use 120 
of NHS resources16. This threshold is increased to £30,000 per QALY for interventions considered 121 
innovative, or if there are particular features relevant to the condition or population receiving the 122 
medicines, or potential for a broader societal impact.  Medicines which are recommended at these 123 
values may in fact reduce population health based on the Department of Health and Social Services’ 124 
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use of £15,000 per QALY as an estimate of the health opportunity cost of NHS expenditures17. The 125 
approval of medicines that qualify for appraisal under the life-extending, end of life criteria further 126 
impact on population health18. The uncertainty, through lack of transparency, of the potential health 127 
opportunity cost of NICE-approved cancer medicines poses a risk, both to the integrity of NICE in 128 
upholding one of its key procedural principles to provide services in a fair and appropriate manner8, 129 
and NHS constitutional commitments to maximise benefits from NHS resources19. In making decisions 130 
implicit, transparency is disputed, and opportunities for independent examination denied in assessing 131 
the value of NHS treatments. 132 
  133 
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Table 1: Reporting of the ICERs of cancer treatments recommended by NICE for routine commissioning, and for new CDF treatments, between April 2016 180 
and March 2018 181 
 
Reported values of ICER range or dominance No ICER value reported by rationale for recommendation 
 
ICER below threshold, or 
dominant 
ICER crosses or above 
thresholds 
Below threshold Not defined No technology appraisal 
Threshold for 
decision-making 
Routine 
commissioning 
New 
CDF 
Routine 
commissioning 
New 
CDF 
Routine 
commissioning 
New 
CDF 
Routine 
commissioning 
New 
CDF 
Routine 
commissioning 
New 
CDF 
Cost minimisation 
with equivalent 
health outcomes 
- - - - 1 - - - - - 
≤£30k per QALY 15 2 5 1 14 8 3 5 - - 
£30k to £50k per 
QALY (meeting “end 
of life” criteria) 
14 4 - 1 18 1 - 10 - - 
Unknown - - - - - - - - - 16 
Total (% of routine 
commissioning or new 
CDF) 
29 
(41%) 
6 
(13%) 
5 
(7%) 
2 
(4%) 
33 
(47%) 
9 
(19%) 
3 
(4%) 
15 
(31%) 
0 
(0%) 
16 
(33%) 
a
All data are based on NICE technology appraisal reports for interventions listed in the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence and NHS England, National Cancer Drugs Fund List  ver1.72 28-Mar-18182 
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Table 2: Time spent in CDF, all drug indications, April 2016 to March 2018 (N=42) 183 
 Time in CDFa 
CDF status ≤ 2 years 2 - 3 years 3 - 4 years ≥ 4 years Unknown 
Managed Access Scheme 3 5 3 5  
Technology appraisal in progress 5    1 
Transition to routine funding 5        
Suspended        2 
Discontinued  1     1 
No data       1 10 
Total, n (%) 14 (33%) 5 (12%) 3 (7%) 6 (14%) 14 (33%) 
a
All data are based on NICE technology appraisal and Managed Access Agreement (MAA) reports for interventions listed in the National Institute for Health 184 
and Care Excellence and NHS England, National Cancer Drugs Fund List  ver1.72 28-Mar-18. Time in CDF was calculated from the entry date into new CDF to 185 
the estimated date of NICE guidance publication. Where no date of publication was available, an estimated date was assumed, based on the MAA reported 186 
end of data collection date, plus 90 days clinical analysis, 90 days submission preparation and 230 days NICE review.  Some MAAs indicate 4 months to 187 
submission post clinical data ready, suggesting 90 days for submission is conservative. 188 
 189 
